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NOTES AND COMMENT
and eight individuals who had indorsed the note for the accommodation of the maker. Two of these co-sureties sought to set off their
deposits against their liability as indorsers. The Court there held
that if the maker is insolvent and all the co-sureties were solvent,
these depositors could offset one-eighth of their liability with their
deposit in the bank. If any one or more of the indorsers are insolvent, the right of set-off will be allowed only to the proportion that
they are required to pay. 10
The conclusion to be reached from a consideration of these cases
is that this state has fallen in line with the majority of the states in
adopting what we believe to be the more logical and just rule. While
it is true that at first glance a denial of the right of set-off would
seem to work a hardship, a consideration of the facts shows that the
adoption of any view contrary to that of the Court of Appeals would
have that effect. As was said by the Court in Lippitt v. Thanws
Loan & Trust Co., 17 "This rule would seem to be based on
sound reason. The indorser cannot lose if the maker be good, while
if the set-off be allowed, the estate of the insolvent may be diminished for the sole benefit of the debtor. He will thus pay less of his
debt than any other debtor, or the indorser would get a larger percentage of his deposit than other depositors. This result would be
inequitable."
RUBIN BARON.

STATUTE OF LImITATIONS-PLEADING BY NON-RESIDENT.

By the Statute 4 and 5 Anne (1705) c. 16, if at the date of
the accrual of the action, the person liable to be sued is absent,
"beyond the seas," the period of limitation does not begin to run
in favor of such person until his return into the realm.' That
statute was construed "to include both residents and non-residents,
subjects and foreigners alike." 2 Practically all of the states of the
United States have adopted that statute in some form, and have,
"Of course, where the note is made for the accommodation of one who

appears thereon as indorser, and the bank discounts the same and credits the
proceeds to his account with knowledge of its accommodation character, the

indorser in such cases, not having any recourse to the maker, a set-off will be
allowed, for any question of an inequitable preference does not then arise.

Building & Engineering Co. v. Northern Bank, 206 N. Y. 400, 99 N. E. 1044
(1912).
"Supra note 1.

'3 STEPHENS, CO-Mm. ON LAws OF ENGLAND

(18th ed. 1925) p. 481.

' Ruggles v. Keeler, 3 Johns. 263, 267 (N. Y. 1808); Mason, Chapin &

Co. v. Union Mills Paper Mfg. Co., 81 Md. 446, 32 Atl. 311 (1895).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
construed it to apply to both residents
in almost all the jurisdictions,
3
and non-residents.
New York State adopted such a statute, and today it provides
in part: "If when the cause of action accrues against a person,
he is without the state, the action may be commenced within the
time limited therefor, after his return into the state. 4 The construction 5put upon the statute includes both residents and nonresidents.
The construction of the statute as applying to non-residents
raised an unusual and interesting question in the very early history
of the state of New York, and such question continues to come
up in present-day litigation. In the year 1808 in the case of Ruggles
v. Keeler,6 the following situation was presented: An action in
assumpsit was commenced in this state by a resident of Connecticut
against a resident of the same state. The defendant, as a set-off,
pleaded certain demands which if they had been sued on in Connecticut, the state in which they arose, would have been barred by
the six-year Statute of Limitations of that state. Chief Judge Kent
held that the defendant was entitled to a set-off of such demands, on
the ground that if the defendant had pursued the present plaintiff
in this state and sued here on those demands, the present plaintiff
could not set up the New York six-year statute of limitations, for
in view of the statute similar to the one above quoted, 7 the limitations against the defendant's right of action did not begin to run
until the plaintiff had come within this state, and therefore as plaintiff had not been here more than six years, defendant would be
entitled to maintain the action. The "decision inevitably involves
the principle that a foreign plaintiff may institute an action against
his debtor, coming into the State of New York, upon a cause of
action, of more than six years' standing provided he has not suffered his debtor to reside there six years before commencing his
33 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1924) §2007. But in a number of the states,
notably New Jersey, Texas and Oregon, the rule is contra. See Beardsley v.
Southmayd, 15 N. J. L. 171 (1835); McCormick v. Blanchard, 7 Ore. 232
(1879); Crane v. Jones, 24 Ore. 419, 33 Pac. 869 (1893); Wilson v.
Dagett, 88 Tex. 375, 31 S. W. 619 (1895); Huff v. Crawford, 88 Tex. 368,
30 S. W. 546 (1895); Lynch v. Ortlieb, 87 Tex. 590, 30 S. W. 545 (1895);
Van Santvoord v. Roettler, 35 Ore. 250, 57 Pac. 628 (1899) ; Pollard v. Allen.
Ct. of Civ. Appeals Tex. No. 656, 171 S. W. 530 (1914); Fargo v. Dickover,
87 Ore. 215, 170 Pac. 289 (1918).
'N. Y. C. P. A. §19.
'Ruggles v. Keeler, mtpra note 2; Cole v. Jessup, 10 N. Y. 96 (1854);
Gans v. Frank, 36 Barb. 320 (N. Y. 1862); Riker v. Curtis, 17 Misc. 134, 39
N. Y. Supp. 340 (1896) ; Moloney v. Tilton, 22 Misc. 134, 39 N. Y. Supp. 340
(1897) ; Ackerman v. Ackerman, 200 N. Y. 72, 93 N. E. 192 (1910) ; National
Surety Co. v. Ruffin, 242 N. Y. 413, 152 N. E. 246 (1925); Laurencelle v.
Laurencelle, 217 App. Div. 159, 216 N. Y. Supp. 384 (2d Dept. 1926) ; Backus
v. Severn, 127 Misc. 776, 216 N. Y. Supp. 381, aff'd, 224 App. Div. 72, 229
N. Y. Supp. 376 (1st Dept. 1926).
'Supra note 2.
S'uprd note 4.
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suit." 8 The argument urged by the plaintiff in the Ruggles case,
against this rule is "that stale demands might in this way be revived
and enforced against persons who happen to be found in this state,
and have not resided here long enough to be protected by the Statute
of Limitations of this State." 9 To this the Court answers "that
a presumption of payment will undoubtedly attach to stale demands." * * * And "that this presumption of payment must as a
matter of evidence, be left in each case to be raised or repelled by
the respective parties and in this way any serious inconvenience
from the revival of dormant claims will be avoided." 10
In 1835, in Beardsley v. Southmayd,"1 a New Jersey Supreme
Court decision, the precise question on a similar set of facts was
determined. The Court there held that the foreign debtor might
plead the New Jersey statute of limitations and that the tolling
statute did not suspend the Statute of Limitations so as to save
the plaintiff's cause of action. Plaintiffs and defendants were both
residents of Connecticut when the cause of action accrued and remained so for more than six years after the accrual. Subsequently,
the plaintiff who was still a non-resident secured jurisdiction of the
defendant in New Jersey. To the defendant's plea of the New Jersey
six-year Statute of Limitations, plaintiff answered, that under the
statute which enacted, that if the debtor "shall not be a resident
in this state when the cause of action accrues, * * * then the period
of his non-residence shall not be computed as any part of the time
limited by the statute," his cause of action was saved, as the defendant being a non-resident, the Statute of Limitations was suspended until he came within the jurisdiction of the state, and that
as defendant had not been in the State of New Jersey more than
six years he could not plead the statute. As to this contention the
Court held: "It is true the plaintiff brings his case prima facie
within the saving influence of the act * * *. But no such equity
exists in reference to foreign creditors, whose action did not accrue
here and whose debtor did not reside here when the right of action
accrued. Such a creditor or plaintiff has not been hindered or delayed by the absence of the defendant from this state. Nor was
the defendant in such case bound to come into this state to perform
his contracts, or to be sued in our courts for not doing so. The
doctrine contended for by the plaintiff, would require us to read
our Act of 1820 as if it subjected every stranger coming into this
state, to be liable for the term of six years to the suits of foreign
plaintiffs, wherever the cause of action arose and however antiquated
the claim." 12 As can be seen, the Beardsley case is contra to the
rule set down in the Ruggles case and restricts the saving statute
'Beardsley v. Southmayd, supra note 3, at 174.
o Ruggles v. Keeler, supra note 2, at 267.

"ld.268.

'Supra note 3.
'Beardsley v. Southmayd, supra note 3, at 177
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solely to residents who are such when the cause of action accrues.
The theory on which the decision is based is that if a non-resident
plaintiff elects to sue in the state of New Jersey, he must take that
privilege burdened with the duty of prompt action and must sue
upon his demand before statutes of the forum which he has chosen
run against it. In disapproving the rule in the Ruggles case, the
Court in the Beardsley case also disapproved of the answer given
by the Court to the plaintiff's claim of "stale demands." It says,
"the court as may be seen in that case, 3 Johns. R. 263, 268, instead of the shield which the salutary and quieting influence of the
statute would afford a defendant under such circumstances, would
leave him to the uncertain and doubtful protection of presumptive
payment. It is very easy to see, that in many cases, mere presumption of payment, from lapse of time would be a feeble and precarious defense where in a suit between the parties at home the
statute would be a positive bar." 13
The courts of the State of Oregon, in construing a statute
similar to that of New York State, held that the statute did not
apply where the litigants were non-residents and that the foreign
debtor may plead the Oregon Statute of Limitations as a bar to
the action. 14 In that case plaintiff pleaded that he had recovered
a judgment in South Dakota against the defendants in 1895, who
were then residents of that state; that under the laws of South
Dakota an action on a judgment may be brought within twenty
years, that under the laws of Oregon, the period is ten years, and
that as defendant has not resided in Oregon more than ten years,
statute has not run against plaintiff's claim. The Court held that
the saving clause of the statute did not apply to the plaintiff in that
the ten-year Statute of Limitations was not suspended in favor of
the plaintiff, but ran from the date of accrual of the cause of action
in South Dakota and hence the action is barred. The Courts of
Texas have held substantially the same. 15
The New York Courts have steadfastly clung to the rule of
Ruggles v. Keeler through a long line of decisions 16 and it has
been followed by the courts of many sister states. 17
No dissent
was heard in New York until 1928 when Judge O'Malley in Garrison v. Newman,' 8 said: "We think it would lead to a practical
13Id. 174.

" Fargo v. Dickover, supra note 3.
"3See Texas cases, supra note 3.
" 0lcott v. Tioga R. Co., 20 N. Y. 510 (1859) ; Gans v. Frank, supra note
5; Power v. Hathaway, 43 Barb. 214 (N. Y. 1864); Mayer v. Friedman, 7 Hun

218 (N. Y. 1876); Miller v. Brenham, 7 Hun 330 (N. Y. 1876), aff'd, 68 N. Y.
83 (1877) ; Riker v. Curtis, supra note 5; Plummer v. Lowenthal, 165 N. Y.
Supp. 220 (App. T. 1st Dept. 1917) ; Laurencelle v. Laurencelle, stpra note 5.
17 Hatch v. Spofford, 24 Conn. 432 (1856); Paine v. Drew, 44 N. H. 306
(1862); Mason, Chapin & Co. v. Union Mills Paper Mfg. Co., szapra note 2;
Belden v. Blackman, 118 Mich. 448, 76 N. W. 979 (1898).
'222 App. Div. 498, 227 N. Y. Supp. 78 (lst Dept. 1928).
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absurdity to hold that where both parties to an action are nonresidents at the time of the accrual of the right of action in favor
of one of them, and which accrued without the jurisdiction, that
the six-year statute of limitations would not start to run until the
non-resident plaintiff had come into this jurisdiction. Were such
a rule to be adopted, rights of action accruing outside this state,
between non-residents at the time of such accrual would be kept
alive interminably. The courts of this state would be flooded with
actions brought on ancient and well-nigh forgotten rights. It would
lead to manifest injustice in many cases because of the long lapse
of time, resulting in loss of evidence and deprivation of witnesses." 19
The gist of Garrisonv. Newjnan, is an echo of the principles
set forth in Beardsley v. Southmayd, but it is an echo that has been
quickly silenced. For in Meyer v. Credit Lyonais,20 the Court of
Appeals has reaffirmed the rule of Ruggles v. Keeler. The parties
were both non-residents. The plaintiff is suing the defendant on
a claim which arose in Russia in 1918 against a French bank. At
the commencement of the action in 1930 neither the Russian nor
the French statute of limitations had run against the claim. Here
too the plaintiff claims that Section 19 of the New York Civil
Practice Act, the saving statute, does not favor the plaintiff, and
defendant thus sets up the six-year statute as a bar to the plaintiff's claim. Judge Hubbs, writing for the court, said: "We believe the question is no longer open in this court. Ever since the
opinion rendered in the case of Ruggles v. Keeler * * * it has
been the accepted law of this state that where a non-resident sues
another non-resident in the courts of this state upon a claim which
arose in a foreign jurisdiction, the non-resident defendant may not
successfully plead our statute of limitation as a bar to the action * * *. So far as the case of Garrison v. Newmai is in conflict,
it is disapproved." 21

The situation in the Meyers case differs from the Ruggles case
in only one particular and that is: the claim had not been barred
in the foreign jurisdiction when suit was commenced in this state.
But the Court reaches the same result and the rule in 1932 remains
as established in 1808.
The practical result of the rule is that as between non-residents
there can never be a real barring of a debt by limitations. The
debtor would not be safe in this state from the annoyance of defending stale claims which have been barred in the jurisdiction
in which they arose. If the long line of decisions in support of
the principle are fundamentally correct, there can never be a quieting of the affairs of a non-resident debtor on coming into this state
until he has lived here the full period of the Statute of Limitations.
Id. 81.
'259 N. Y. 399, 182 N. E. 63 (1932).
"Id.402, 404.
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Statutes of limitation have been called statutes of repose.2 2 The
adoption of the New Jersey rule in New York State would accomplish such repose.
ALFRED R. Voso.

THE JOINT RESOLUTION AS A METHOD OF REDISTRICTING STATES.

The Supreme Court recently had occasion to interpret the term
"Legislature" under Section 4 of Article I of the Federal Constitution which makes provision for the election of representatives,
as follows:
"The times, places and manner of holding elections for
senators and representatives shall be prescribed in each state
by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time
by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places
of choosing senators."
The issue arose when the State of New York, by concurrent
resolution of the Senate and Assembly, adopted April 10, 1931,
sought to accomplish the districting of the state into forty-five districts for the election of representatives to the Congress of the
*United States. The Secretary of State, invoking the provisions of
Article I, Section 4 of the Federal Constitution, and the requirements of the New York State Constitution, refused to certify that
representatives were to be elected in the congressional districts
defined in the resolution, in that it required the enactment of a law
which had to be approved by the Governor. Mandamus proceedings were commenced to compel the Secretary of State to carry
out the provisions of the concurrent resolution. The state courts,
in sustaining the respondent's contention, held that the term contemplated the exercise of the law-making power. The Supreme
Court affirmed this decision.'
Ordinarily the term "legislature" has reference to a representative law-making body. It has the power to do certain things with'Adams v. Coon. 36 Okla. 644, 129 Pac. 851 (1913) p. 853: "Statutes of
Limitation are statutes of repose, the object of which is to suppress fraudulent
and stale claims from springing up at great distances of time and surprising
the parties or their representatives, when all the proper vouchers and evidence
are lost, or the facts have become obscure from the lapse of time, or the defective memory or death or removal of witnesses. 25 Cyc. 985." See also Hart
v. Goadby, 72 Misc. 232, 129 N. Y. Supp. 892 (1911); Hayes v. Mclntire, 45

Fed. 529 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1891).

1
Koenig v. Flynn, 141 Misc. 840, 253 N. Y. Supp. 554 (1931), aff'd, 234
App. Div. 139, 254 N. Y. Supp. 339 (1st Dept. 1931), aff'd, 258 N. Y. 292,
179 N. E. 705 (1932), af'd, 285 U. S.355, 52 Sup. Ct. 403 (1932).

